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Russian naval policy regarding the 
law of the sea is in an interesting 
dilemma. The Soviet state is a consider-
able maritime power with a strong navy, 
a large merchant marine, and a very 
sizable fishing fleet. In order to exploit 
these assets to the full, the Russian 
Navy supports traditional legal freedoms 
of the high seas, so as to give her ships 
the greatest access to the world's 
oceans. Such support for traditional 
laws of the sea puts the Soviet Union 
alongside other maritime powers like 
the United States and the United King-
dom, all resisting claims of less de-
veloped states to greater national juris-
diction in the oceans. But the Soviet 
Union is unhappy with a "conservative" 
label and wants to disassociate herself 
from Western "imperialists." The Rus-
sians seek to demonstrate their soli-
darity with underdeveloped states which 
attack great power control of the seas. 
Russian naval policy thus attempts to 
reconcile support for traditional sea law 
with sympathy for the complaints of 
the underdeveloped states. This recon-
ciliation is, of course, difficult and not 
altogether successful. 
An indication of the problems which 
Soviet naval ocean policy faces is to be 
found in the concluding number of a 
series of articles by the commander in 
chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral of 
the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov. The articles, 
entitled "Navies in War and in Peace," 
are published in the Russian Naval 
Digest (Morskoy Sbornik) and are an 
authoritative expression of Soviet naval 
policy meant for Russian naval officers 
and those others concerned with Rus-
sian maritime strategy. The final install-
ment of "Navies in War and in Peace" 
appeared in the February 1973 issue of 
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the Naval Digest and was composed of 
two subsections, "Some Problems of 
Mastering the World Ocean" and "The 
Problems of a Modem Navy.',l The first 
of these is almost exclusively concerned 
with law of the sea questions, while the 
second is a general resume of all the 
articles in the series and does not 
concern us here. "Some Problems of 
Mastering the World Ocean" has essen-
tially three themes: that the imperialist 
states are responsible for the crisis in 
ocean law, that traditional freedoms of 
the high seas should be preserved, and 
that a powerful international regime for 
the high seas is a dangerous proposal. 
Admiral Gorshkov argues that the 
challenge to traditional freedoms of the 
high seas comes from the imperialist 
states who seek to divide the resources 
of the ocea)ls: 
In analyzing the essence of 
imperialism, Vladimir Ilich Lenin 
pointed out that financial capital, 
being afraid of lagging behind in 
the furious struggle for the still 
underdeveloped part of the world, 
is striving to seize as many dif-
ferent expanses of the globe as 
possible, assuming that they will 
later become a source of raw 
materials ... 
In recent decades in the era of 
the exploitation of the resources 
of the World Ocean, an ever in-
creasing struggle has begun be-
tween imperialist countries for the 
division of it for economic and 
military aims, since it is becoming 
an immediate objective of their 
expansion.2 
One would assume from Gorshkov's 
analysis that it is the Western "imperial-
ist" states which have made large claims 
to national maritime jurisdictions: 
... already today attempts are 
being made to usurp individual 
areas of it (the World Ocean) by 
certain capitalist states and to 
divide up spheres of influence in 
it. Thus, voices are being heard in 
the U.S. Congress calling on 
Americans to move to the east 
and by 1980 to occupy the Atlan-
tic Ocean bottom to the Mid-
Atlantic ridge, for according to 
the authors of these statements, 
when it is a question of the ocean 
bottom, no one mentions borders: 
he who takes is right. A highly 
alarming symptom is the practice 
of the extension by certain states 
of the limits of their territorial sea 
up to 200 miles, which is nothing 
other than an attempt to seize 
great expanses of the ocean.3 
Thus, Gorshkov bends the facts to 
demonstrate that Leninist theory ex-
plains current world ocean problems. 
Since the imperialist states are forced, in 
theory, to seize underdeveloped areas of 
the globe, it must be the imperialist 
states which are mounting the attack on 
the freedoms of the high seas by claim-
ing extensive national slices of the seas. 
But, in fact, the challenge to the tradi: 
tional freedoms of the high seas is being 
mounted by the underdeveloped 
nations. The first claim to a 200·mile 
territorial sea came from Chile in 1947 
when that state established her "protec-
tion and control ... over all the sea 
included between the perimeter formed 
by the coast and a mathematical parallel 
projected out to sea at a distance of two 
hundred marine miles.,,4 In their San-
tiago "Declaration on the Maritime 
Zone" of 1952, Chile, Ecuador and Peru 
proclaimed: " ... as a principle of their 
international maritime policy that each 
of them possesses sole sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the area of sea adjacent 
to the coast of its own country and 
extending not less than 200 nautical 
miles from the said coast.',5 
Far from encouraging the 200-mile 
claims, the Western maritime powers 
have protested vigorously when the 
claims have been made. When Chile 
made her original 200-mile claim in 
1948, the United States responded with 
a protest note, complaining the "prin-
ciples underlying the Chilean Declara-
tion ... appear to be at variance with 
the generally accepted principles of in-
ternational law.,,6 The continuing 
American refusal to accept 200-mile 
claims off the west coast of Latin 
America is reflected in the conflict 
between American tuna boats and 
coastal patrols which surfaces regularly 
in the daily press. Similarly, the British 
Government has resisted greater fishing 
zones off of Iceland and may only be 
conceding her case now because of 
NATO pressure. 
The Western states have contributed 
to the crisis in ocean law, but not by 
making 20Q·mile claims. The beginning 
of the challenge to traditional freedoms 
of the high seas came with the Truman 
Proclamation of 1945, when the United 
States claimed jurisdiction over the re-
sources of the Continental Shelf. But 
the American claim to the shelf was 
echoed by other nations and finally 
embodied in the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf of 1958, which has 
been signed by most of the nations, 
including the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union has its own interest in ocean 
resources. As Admiral Gorshkov puts it: 
The CPSU program calls for not 
only the utilization of known 
natural resources, but also pros-
pecting for new ones. The World 
Ocean is assuming extreme impor-
tance in connection with this. The 
study of it and utilization of 
resources is becoming one of the 
greatest state problems aimed at 
supporting the economic might of 
the Soviet Union.7 
Can the Russian "utilization of re-
sources" be distinguished from the 
imperialists' "seizure" of raw materials? 
Yes, if you assume that: " ... the im-
perialist states are no longer restricting 
themselves by their own laws on the 
exploitation of the natural riches of the 
continental shelf: they are striving to 
extend their national jurisdictions to the 
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open waters of seas and oceans located 
vast distances from their shores.,,8 But 
the real challenge to traditional legal 
freedoms of the high seas comes not 
from the "imperialist"; rather, it is the 
voice of the underdeveloped states 
which is demanding national control 
over "seas and oceans located vast dis-
tances from their shores." As the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee 
reported at Colombo in 1971: "Most 
delegations felt able to accept twelve 
miles as the breadth of the territorial 
sea, while supporting, in principle, the 
right of a coastal state to claim exclusive 
jurisdiction over an adjacent zone for 
economic purposes.,,9 This demand for 
an economic zone beyond territorial 
waters was seconded by the African 
States Regional Seminar on the Law of 
the Sea at Yaounde'in 1972: 
The African states have equally 
the right to establish beyond the 
territorial sea an economic zone 
over which they will have an 
exclusive jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of control regulation and 
national exploitation of the living 
resources of the sea and their 
reservation for the primary bene-
fit of their peoples and their 
respective economies, and for the 
purpose of the prevention and 
control of pollution. 10 
The motivation for the Santiago 
Declaration, the Colombo Declaration, 
and the Yaounde' Declaration is the 
same. The less developed states want to 
reserve ocean resources to themselves, 
fearing that the more developed states, 
"imperialist" or "socialist" alike, will be 
able to use the traditional freedoms of 
the high seas to acquire an unduly great 
proportion of the sea's fish, oil, and 
minerals. Unless the underdeveloped 
states restrict the freedoms of the high 
seas, the rich states with the most 
advanced techniques will be able to 
exploit the resources of the oceans most 
effectively. 
In fact, if not in theory, Gorshkov 
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aligns the Soviet Union with the "im-
perialists" and not with the under-
developed world. As the article makes 
clear, Russian policy is "conservative." 
The Soviet Navy is in favor of restricting 
greater claims to national jurisdiction: 
The key to the 50lution of this 
question is the strict establish-
ment of limitations on the 
breadths of territorial seas, since a 
further extension could create the 
danger of an actual division of the 
high seas. Such a danger is already 
taking shape today, if you con-
sider scientific technical progress 
and the modem means and practi-
cal capabilities which states 
presently have at their disposal. 
Based on existing practice and a 
sensible unity of interests of the 
coastal states and of the principle 
of freedom of the high seas, it 
would seem completely accept-
able to limit the breadth of the 
territorial sea to limits of up to 12 
miles. 11 
As we have seen, even if some non-Latin 
American developing countries might 
endorse a maximum of 12-mile terri-
torial seas, they are, generally, unwilling 
to prohibit the extension of an eco-
nomic zone which would reserve re-
sources to the coastal state. Such an 
economic zone would not only threaten 
"imperialist" "seizure" of raw materials 
but Russian "utilization" of the same. 
Even the extension of territorial seas 
to 12 miles poses problems for the 
Soviet Union. Key straits, like Gibraltar, 
would fall within territorial seas. Ac-
cordingly, Gorshkov proposes: ..... in 
those straits which connect the open 
seas and are used for international 
shipping, all transiting ships (and in the 
wider straits also passing aircraft) must 
be accorded equal freedom of transit 
and overflight.,,12 It is not surprising 
that, in this matter, the interests of the 
two great naval powers should coincide 
and that Gorshkov's call for "equal 
freedom of transit and overflight" 
through straits is matched by President 
Nixon's preference for "free transit 
through international straits.',13 The 
Third World, however, does not gener-
ally accept the notion of free transit: 
(From the Colombo Declaration) 
While all delegations were in 
agreement that a strait used for 
international navigation should in 
times of peace remain free for the 
innocent passage of merchant 
ships of all countries, subject to 
rules and regulations of the ri-
parian states, many delegations 
rejected both the "corridor of 
high seas" and "free transit" con-
cepts. 14 
For a naval power, innocent passage is 
less satisfactory than free transit be-
cause on an innocent passage subma-
rines must surface and no overflights are 
permitted. Some states, including the 
Soviet Union, maintain that innocent 
passage by warships is only permitted 
with notice. Thus, once again, the com-
mon maritime interests of the United 
States and the Soviet Union find them 
linked against the less powerful under-
developed states. 
Gorshkov calls the freedom of the 
high seas "the main legal instrument 
ensuring the regulation of the mutual 
relations between sovereign states whose 
interests come into contact with one 
another in the international waters of 
the World Ocean.',15 How does Soviet 
policy attempt to reconcile this freedom 
with the demands of the Third World 
for a new international maritime order? 
First, as seen above, the argument is 
made that the real challenge to maritime 
order is not a challenge from the under-
developed states but from the "imperial-
ist" states. This argument fails to 
properly account for the realities of the 
situation. Second, Gorshkov contends 
that Third World states are mistaken in 
promoting a revision of the law of the 
sea: 
There are also statements even 
against freedom of the high seas 
on the ground that this principle 
is outmoded and is being used by 
the imperialists to the detriment 
of the interests of the developing 
countries. Our position on this 
question is very clear. The im-
perialists' violation of the legal 
norms attests not to the insuf-
ficient effectiveness of these 
norms, but rather to the strength-
ened aggressiveness of imperialism 
itself, which is stressed in the 
decisions of the 24th CPSU Con-
gress. Therefore, it is not the 
norms themselves which must be 
changed, but first of all coopera-
tion must be achieved between 
peace-loving forces in order to 
force the imperialist to strictly 
observe existing regulations. 16 
But existing regulations mean that 
modern fishing fleets, American, Japa-
nese or Russian, can fish within the 
200·mile limits which several Third 
World countries demand. Existing regu-
lations mean that any nation can sail its 
naval fleets within close proximity to 
Third World coasts. Accordingly, many 
underdeveloped countries are insisting 
that existing regulations be changed. As 
the Latin American countries declared 
at Montevideo in 1970: "The right to 
establish the limits of their maritime 
sovereignty and jurisdiction in accor-
dance with their geographical and geo-
logical characteristics and with the fac-
tors governing the existence of marine 
resources and the need for their rational 
utilization (is a basic principle of the 
Law of the Sea). ,,17 
As an alternative to either maintain-
ing the embattled traditional freedoms 
of. the high sea or permitting national 
claims to carve the oceans into national 
lakes, the United States, among others, 
has proposed the establishment of an 
international ocean regime. The charac-
ter of the American proposal was out-
lined in an important Presidential an-
nouncement in 1970: 
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Therefore, I am today proposing 
that all nations adopt as soon as 
possible a treaty under which they 
would renounce all national 
claims over the natural resources 
of the sea-bed beyond the point 
where the high seas reach a depth 
of 200 metres (218.8 yards), and 
would agree to regard these re-
sources as the common heritage of 
mankind. The treaty should estab-
lish an international regime for 
the exploitation of sea-bed re-
sources beyond this limit. The 
regime should provide for the 
collection of substantial mineral 
resources to be used for interna-
tional community purposes, par-
ticularly economic assistance to 
developing countries. It should 
also establish general rules to pre-
vent unreasonable interference 
with other uses of the ocean, to 
protect the ocean from pollution, 
to assure the integrity of the 
investment necessary for such ex-
ploitation and to provide for 
peaceful and compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. 18 
The idea of an international regime 
has generally been endorsed by Third 
World states. For example, it received 
the support of the Third Conference of 
Heads of State or Government of Non-
Aligned Countries in Lusaka in 1970: 
... an international regime, in-
cluding appropriate international 
machinery to give effect to its 
promises should be established by 
an international treaty. The re-
gime should provide for the or-
derly development and rational 
management of the area and its 
resources and ensure the equitable 
sharing by the international com-
munity in the benefits derived 
therefrom. It should also make 
adequate provisions to minimize 
fluctuation of prices of land 
minerals and raw materials that 
may result from such activity. 1 9 
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But Admiral Gorshj:(ov feels that 
proposals for an international ocean 
regime are unwise: 
Several developing countries are 
steadily advancing the idea of 
developing a convention on the 
seabed regime and on creating an 
international organ with very ex-
tensive powers which would be-
come, essentially, a supranational 
organ and would control all ex-
ploitation of the seabed con-
ducted by different countries. It is 
quite evident that such an ap-
proach is not very realistic, since 
it actually envisions an institution 
of some sort of international con-
sortium in which inevitably, due 
to the objective laws of the capi-
talists' market, the largest im-
perialist monopolies would play 
the major role. Therefore, regard-
less of the good intention of the 
authors of this idea, the power in 
it would belong to precisely those 
forces against whom the creation 
of such an organ is intended to 
protect.2° 
Thus, Soviet naval policy, as re-
flected in Admiral Gorshkov's article, 
appears unable to satisfactorily resolve 
the dilemma of supporting the freedoms 
of the high seas while satisfying the 
demands of the underdeveloped world 
for a greater share of ocean resources. 
Gorshkov's argument attempts the 
reconciliation by pretending that the 
real challenge to the traditional law of 
the sea is being mounted by the "im-
perialist" states. Seemingly, then, the 
Soviet Union can both support the 
traditional rules and take an anti-
imperialist stand. But the facts belie the 
Gorshkov approach because the im-
perialist states are supporting, not at-
tacking, the traditional rules. It is in 
American interests, as it is in Soviet 
interests, to ~eep territorial waters nar-
row and permit free transit through 
straits. In this fashion we both protect 
the maneuverability of our naval fleets 
and leave the oceans open to our eco-
nomic use. The challenge to traditional 
rules of international sea law comes 
from the underdeveloped states which, 
naturally, prefer to protect a share of 
ocean resources through the exercise of 
sovereignty because they do not have 
the technological wherewithal to exploit 
them in an ocean free-for-all and which 
stand to gain little from greater mobility 
for great power navies. 
In defending the existing maritime 
system, the Soviet Union finds itself in a 
theoretical predicament. The Russians 
are now aligned with the "imperialist" 
powers, resisting the attempt of the 
Third World to rewrite ocean law in 
favor of developing states. The United 
States has moved somewhat over toward 
the demands of the Third World by 
offering to trade an international regime 
with control and/or proceeds from 
ocean exploitation for narrow territorial 
seas and free transit through straits. 
Fearing that an international regime 
would be in the control of the "im-
perialists" or, perhaps, because actual 
control might lie with the developing 
states, the Soviet position, as stated by 
Gorshkov, is to oppose a powerful 
international ocean regime. Instead, the 
Soviet Union insists that "existing regu-
lations" should be more conscientiously 
obeyed. But an international regime 
which would donate proceeds to the 
needs of the developing states is more to 
the benefit of the Third World than an 
"improved" status quo because the 
underdeveloped states cannot hope to 
effectively compete with the exploiting 
technology of the developed states. Ac-
cordingly, the Third World supports 
either an extension of national jurisdic-
tion or an international regime or some 
combination of the two. Neither alter-
native is fully acceptable to Admiral 
Gorshkov. 
Ironically, then, Gorshkov finds him-
self in a more "conservative" position 
than the United States. While both 
superpowers favor maximum mobility 
for their fleets, the United States is 
willing to trade this mobility for an 
international regime. Gorshkov seems 
unwilling to accept the regime alterna· 
tive. Despite Soviet protestations and 
frustrations, the Soviet Navy is com-
mitted to traditional freedoms of the 
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high seas for reasons befitting a mari-
time power; it is little served by a 
radical change in the status quo. As a 
consequence, Admiral Gorshkov finds 
himself opposed to the demands of the 
Third World bloc, no matter how much 
he doth protest. 
NOTES 
1. S.G. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," Morskoy Sbornik, No.2, 1973, pp.13-25. 
2. Ibid., p. 13. 
3. Ibid. 
4. "Declaration of President of Chile Claiming Jurisdiction over Seas to a Distance of 200 
Miles," 25 June 1947, in Norman J. Padelford, Public Policy for the Seas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1970), pp. 85·86. 
5. United Nations, General Assembly, Agreement (Declaration on the Maritime Zone) 
Between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, Signed at the First Conference on the Exploitation and 
Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific, Santiago, 18 August 1952 (AIAC 
135/Rev. 1), 12 August 1968, pp. 11-12. 
6. "United States Note of Protest to the Government of Chile," 2 July 1948, Padelford, p. 
87. 
7. Gorshkov, p. 15. 
8. Ibid., p. 14. 
9. United Nations, General Assembly, Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, 
Twelfth Session, Colombo, Report of the Sub-Committee on the Law of the Sea, 18-27 January 
1971 (AIAC 138/34), 30 April 1971, p. 7. 
10. "Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law 
of the Sea, Held in Yaounde'," 20-30 June 1972, International Legal Materials, vol. XII, No.1, p. 
210. 
11. Gorshkov, p. 16. 
12. Ibid., p. 17. 
13. United Nations, General Assembly, R.M. Nixon, Announcement on United States 
Oceans Policy, 23 May 1970 (A/AC 138/22), 25 May 1970, p. 4. 
14. United Nations, General Assembly, Colombo, p. 13. 
15. Gorshkov, p. 14. 
16. Ibid., p. 16. 
17. United Nations, General Assembly, Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, 8 
May 1970 (AIAC 138/34), 30 April 1971, p. 3. 
18. United Nations, General Assembly, Nixon, p. 2. 
19. United Nations, General Assembly, Lusaka Declaration of Peace, Independence, 
Development, Co-operation and Democratization of International Relations and Resolutions of 
the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 8-10 
September 1970 (AIAC 138/34),30 April 1971, p. 5. 
20. Gorshkov, p. 16. 
----'¥----
